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ABSTRACT The forthcoming communication networks for public safety authorities rely on the fifth
generation (5G) of mobile networking technologies. Police officers, paramedics, border guards, as well as
fire and rescue personnel, will connect through commercial operator’s access network and rapidly deploy-
able tactical bubbles. This transition from closed and dedicated infrastructure to hybrid architecture will
expand the threat surface and expose mission-critical applications and sensitive information to cyber and
physical adversaries. We explore and survey security architecture and enablers for prioritized public safety
communication in 5G networks. We identify security threat scenarios and analyze enabling vulnerabilities,
threat actors, attacks vectors, as well as risk levels. Security enablers are surveyed for tactical access
and core networks, commercial infrastructure, and mission-critical applications, starting from push-to-
talk and group video communication and leading to situational-awareness and remote-controlled systems.
Two solutions are trialed and described in more detail: remote attestation enhanced access control for
constrained devices, and securing of satellite backhauls. We also discuss future research directions high-
lighting the need for enablers to automate security of rapid deployments, for military-grade cost-effective
customizations of commercial network services to ensure robustness, and for hardening of various types
of public safety equipment.
INDEX TERMS 5G, cybersecurity, hybrid architecture, mobile network, public safety, security, survey,
tactical bubble, trials.
I. INTRODUCTION
PUBLIC safety actors, including law enforcement, bordercontrol, as well as fire and rescue services, have tradi-
tionally used closed networks with high-security and narrow-
bandwidth properties for voice and text-based communica-
tion. However, the high costs of maintaining a dedicated
communication infrastructure as well as potential advan-
tages from emerging applications—such as surveillance and
situational-awareness based on unmanned aerial systems,
wireless and wearable sensor networks, high-definition
video, augmented reality, as well as autonomous vehicles
and robots—necessitate an upgrading of the networking
approach. The next generation of public safety networks
are expected [1] to be based on 3GPP specified broadband
mobile technologies and to follow hybrid architecture con-
sisting of both commercial mobile operator network infras-
tructure as well as rapidly deployable tactical network
bubbles. Tactical bubbles provide extra capacity and cov-
erage for public safety users in remote rural locations and
in cases where availability of commercial network is dis-
rupted, e.g., due to congestion, failure, cyber-attack, or
disaster. The hybrid network infrastructure promises cost-
effective means to achieve communication in any location
with good quality (broadband, low latency, low jitter, and
scalability). However, sharing infrastructure between civil-
ian and public safety users introduces new challenges for
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TABLE 1. Surveys in the area of public safety communications (PSC), rapidly deployable network (RDN), and 5G and beyond network security. The main focus is marked with •
and shortly covered topics are marked with ◦.
ensuring availability, trustworthiness, and security. The threat
landscape in commercial and Internet-exposed networks is
significantly larger when compared to dedicated and closed
networks.
5G standardization, being carried out by the third genera-
tion partnership project (3GPP) and industry, is progressing
to secure the access and core networks [2], [3] and to support
public safety communications with isolated operational capa-
bilities [4]–[6], with mission-critical voice [7], data [8], and
video [9] applications, and with a security framework [10].
However, the standardization focuses on the network per-
spective and ignores many application, user equipment, life
cycle, infrastructure, and use case specific issues needed
for a holistic point of view. Recent surveys [11]–[14] on
security of the 5G networks have identified and classified
threats without focusing on public safety specific require-
ments. On the other hand, existing surveys [1], [15]–[17] on
public safety communication have addressed mission-critical
applications on commercial 5G mobile networks without
a security focus. Surveys on security for public safety com-
munication have focused on dedicated networks [18]–[20]
or previous generations [5], [21] and have emphasized
particular challenges like rapid deployment [22]–[24],
privacy [21], or identification [25]. Table 1 highlights
the existing surveying efforts and their relation to our
contributions.
We complement the existing research efforts by provid-
ing an up-to-date comprehensive survey of security threats
and solutions for public safety in the 5G era. We provide
an analysis of public safety communication related secu-
rity requirements and characteristics. Specifically we provide
insights and observations on challenges arising from a) the
utilization of the 5G communication standards and civilian
infrastructure, b) the emergence of IoT equipment, c) tactical
communications in remote locations with potentially limited
or disconnected backhaul, and d) distributed mission-critical
application architectures.
We point-out current challenges and highlight the needs
for future research. We also contribute by demonstrating
solutions to two pressing challenges.
1) We show a scalable and secure approach to attach IoT
devices to tactical bubbles. Instead of just authenti-
cating identities of devices, we recognize and verify
the type and software of devices. By remotely attest-
ing [26] the configuration and integrity of equipment
software, we minimize the threat of malware compro-
mising mission-critical operations.
2) We also experiment with and analyze secure satellite
links for tactical backhauls. The development of non-
terrestrial 5G is progressing [27]–[30] and can provide
a viable alternative to increase resiliency and redun-
dancy for mission-critical applications. We research and
analyze what the limited backhaul connection means for
the mission-critical applications. Do the security solu-
tions prevent optimization of communications? Will the
limited backhaul become the weakest link or lead to
vulnerabilities that adversaries may exploit?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we provide an introduction to hybrid architec-
ture and technologies that will support future public safety
user cases. The section will also identify the assets that are
at stake. Section III introduces a framework for analyzing
security threats and use cases. The section categorizes adver-
saries, main vulnerabilities, attack vectors, and risk levels
within the public safety scene. Section IV explores security—
at the intersections of mobile communication networks and
public safety use cases—by analyzing threatened assets
against the threat analysis framework. The section presents
a set of scenarios that characterize typical and unique threats
in public safety communications. Section V identifies and
classifies security requirements and solutions. Section VI
describes our trials and two demonstrated security enablers in
more detail. The enablers are analyzed against the framework
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FIGURE 1. The next generation communication architecture for public safety utilizes both tactical bubbles and commercial operators’ infrastructure.
and the threat scenarios. Section VII provides a discussion
on future challenges and research directions. Section VIII
presents our conclusions.
II. PUBLIC SAFETY NETWORK EVOLUTION AND USE
CASES
This section provides an overview of next generation public
safety communication by describing the characteristics of
technologies and highlighting typical use cases as well as
their requirements and involved security critical assets. The
central elements are illustrated in Fig. 1.
A. EVOLUTION TOWARDS HYBRID 5G BASED
ARCHITECTURE
New mission-critical applications services demand improved
quality properties, higher bandwidth, and lower latency from
the network. Latest releases of 3GPP specifications, long-
term evolution (LTE) and 5G, provide the technology to
fulfil these requirements. Commercial operators can support
the public safety authorities by allowing them to share the
network with civilian users. However, in many countries and
cases, commercial networks cannot fulfil the requirements
for the coverage and capacity alone.
The need for cost-efficient capacity with sufficient relia-
bility and coverage can be achieved with hybrid approach.
Commercial network infrastructure that is shared with civil-
ians allocates capacity for public safety users. Tactical
bubbles provide connectivity during emergency missions
when the commercial network is not sufficient. This vision
requires that both the commercial mobile networks and tac-
tical bubbles security fulfil the security requirements of the
public safety organizations.
Security in mobile networks has been an evolution.
The first generation of 3GPP’s specifications provided user
identification for billing purposes. The second generation—
including the adaptations developed for public safety com-
munications such as European TETRA [20], [31]–[34] or
North American Project 25 [19], [35]—provided cryptogra-
phy for authentication and to prevent outsider eavesdropping.
The third generation authenticated the network for users. The
fourth generation extended security to support new services
such as device-to-device communication, isolated operations,
multicasting, and mission critical applications. These exten-
sions included end-to-end confidentiality and authenticity in
the application layer. The fifth generation increased robust-
ness against internal threats, enhanced privacy, and eased
customization of services and security for different types of
users. All generations have also patched different vulnera-
bilities and trade-offs that were left over from the previous
generations.
B. AUTHORITIES IN COMMERCIAL OPERATORS’
ACCESS NETWORKS
Commercial mobile operators have ready infrastructures that
can provide both access and backhaul services, i.e., connect
user equipment or tactical networks to centralized mission-
critical services. Public safety operators act as mobile virtual
network operators and manage the core network and appli-
cation services in the cloud. Network products and services
supporting mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) archi-
tecture have emerged from different manufacturers [36]–[39]
and commercial networks are also taken into operational use
by public safety authorities in different countries [40]–[42].
As radio access infrastructures are shared with civilian
users and may occasionally be congested, the public safety
users typically require a priority over other users. Operators
may provide differentiated, application specific, service lev-
els with diverse availability guarantees and QoS properties.
Differentiated services are based on contractual agreements,
service level agreements (SLA), between operators and pub-
lic safety organizations. The policy control function (PCF)
enable application provider to dynamically request availabil-
ity guarantees for traffic flows. The technical alternatives and
protocols for controlling the sharing of network resources
and prioritizing users are described in Table 2.
Core network services, mission-critical services (MCX),
and critical data services, including databases containing
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TABLE 2. Traffic prioritization and infrastructure sharing mechanisms and their
security assumptions.
public safety user information, health records or crime
registers, are not necessary within a commercial network
infrastructure. Authorities are likely to keep these criti-
cal services on their own private servers and only utilize
connectivity provided by the commercial operator’s access
network.
C. TACTICAL BUBBLES
Tactical bubbles are movable, stand-alone, and rapidly
deployable networks that provide 3GPP specified 4G or
5G connectivity [1], [43]. Tactical bubbles contain access
network, essentially a 4G or 5G base station, as well as
core network functions and application services to enable
their usage in isolated scenarios without backhaul connec-
tions to remote services. Several tactical bubbles can be
connected with a tactical backbone to a tactical network.
Tactical bubbles provide additional communication coverage
and capacity when needed, e.g., in rural blind spots within
a commercial network or in failure situations. They may also
increase security by as when they are securely isolated from
the commercial infrastructure. The bubbles can be utilized
in three main alternative modes.
1) The tactical access bubble incorporates access network
functions while core network and application services
are external, received from functions in the cloud or
in another bubble.
2) The regular bubble uses its own access and core func-
tions but receives application services from the cloud
or another bubble.
3) The isolated bubble does not have backhaul and serves
its users independently with all the necessary access,
core, and application functions.
Requirements for tactical bubbles include minimal config-
uration time and efforts. Automation and self-configuration
capabilities are essential as public safety users are not
assumed to be experts in network configuration. Public safety
users typically have primary access to the licensed radio
frequency band. Other users, such as commercial network
operators and civilian traffic, are secondary users and are
given access only when the primary user is not using the
spectrum. The spectrum usage is managed using a centralized
database or by sensing the usage of the spectrum.
D. USE CASES AND ASSETS
The mission critical push-to-talk (PTT) within tactical bub-
ble use case implements the most fundamental service —
group communication (many-to-many audio) — within an
isolated tactical bubble. The use case requires a local and
independent core network and services for group communi-
cation application and security. Sensitive information include
organizational user and group data, which must be available
locally, as well as operational information on the location,
role, and activity of particular users.
The video surveillance within tactical bubble use case
illustrates the capability to transmit larger data streams within
an isolated tactical network. Services needed to implement
this use case include broadband access and core, video
servers and, optionally, local edge acceleration. Broadcasting
services may be utilized to optimize the use of bubble
bandwidth and prioritization services to ensure service for
the most critical users and applications, typically audio, in
overload situations. Jeopardized information includes video
stream as well as the location of cameras.
In the UAV control within tactical bubble use case pub-
lic safety users within an isolated tactical network acquire
aerial situational data from the local mission site. Essential
elements needed to realize the use case include local
connectivity and remote control applications. Jeopardized
information includes navigation and control data flows
toward UAV, situational data toward public safety personnel,
as well as operational data, such location and type of UAVs.
In the mission-critical services (MCX) in the cloud use
case application servers and the database are operated in
a remote location. Cloud services and the tactical bubble
are connected with a backhaul, e.g., a commercial mobile
network or satellite. The scale of centralized information is
more massive, as it can contain national databases, and thus
more information is in jeopardy. The central service is also
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more critical as geographically distributed users rely on its
availability.
The access through a civilian private network use case
provides public safety users an alternative access network,
which can be utilized when dedicated or commercial
networks is unavailable. For instance, a mining company’s
5G private network or a smart city could support rescue oper-
ations by providing connectivity. Optionally, access could
also be provided to services in private networks, such as
databases containing information on buildings and infras-
tructures. The use case requires federation and cooperation
between private network operators and public safety orga-
nizations to enable users to acquire the credentials and
authorization required for network and service access.
In the access through commercial operator’s network use
case, safety users connect to the civilian infrastructure to
gain access to services in a public safety organization’s
or partner’s private cloud. Communication resources are
now shared with civilians and thus exposed to interferences.
A commercial network may also simultaneously support dif-
ferent public safety organizations, who should be allowed to
cooperate but not to disrupt each other.
III. THREAT LANDSCAPE: AN ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
This section describes the main factors affecting to the secu-
rity of public safety communication. It provides a framework
that enables the analysis of security in different use cases
and particular threat scenarios.
A. THREAT ACTORS
Threat actors can be classified into six main categories which
are characterized by attackers’ motivations and capabilities.
The first category are actors who do not intentionally target
public safety operations but cause unintentional or collateral
damage or interference. The second class is random hackers,
trying to show their skills or get some benefits, but not focus-
ing particularly on public safety networks. The third class are
insiders, personnel or cooperating companies, causing secu-
rity harm intentionally. The fourth class is the criminals and
terrorists trying to prevent particular operation, e.g., to evade
detection or prevent rescue, or for financial gains (e.g., black-
mail ransoms). The fifth class comprises advanced persistent
threat (APT) groups, i.e., adversarial groups with significant
resources, who target public safety agencies or operators in
particular. The sixth class is the foreign agencies attacking
or intruding into a communication network as part of hybrid
warfare.
B. ROOT VULNERABILITIES
Vulnerabilities enabling security breaches can be caused by
failures, errors, or compromises that are made during a dif-
ferent stage of the technology or product life-cycle. The first
vulnerabilities are introduced during standardization. 3GPP’s
security specification has been an evolution where previous
compromises and failures have been corrected. The trend
may also continue in the future.
Implementation failures can be minimized with verifica-
tion, testing, and certification but they cannot be completely
removed. For instance, TLS, which is a central security
protocol for mission-critical applications and management
interfaces of 5G core, is mature but has seen some relatively
recent vulnerabilities [44]–[46]. Also, implementation fail-
ures may be intentional and products contain backdoors [47].
Architectural failures relate to the design and planning
of public safety communication and security architecture
as well as its deployment. For instance, architectures with
interfaces to less trustworthy systems, such as the Internet,
expose communication to threats originating from these
systems. Distributing security functions and data geograph-
ically increases points for adversaries to attack, though
distribution makes architecture stronger by removing the sin-
gle point of failure. Process vulnerabilities are incidents that
occur in non-operational phases of the products and services
lifecycle. For instance, devices may be lost or physically
tampered with during development, supply, storage or main-
tenance phases and credentials may become compromised
during deployment.
Configuration and operational failures are typically the
most common types of root vulnerabilities. Operational fail-
ures are caused by normal end-users. For instance, project
25 had usability issues and non-mandatory end-to-end secu-
rity, which led to the network being used in an unsecure
manner [19]. The number of such failures can be minimized
with standards and implementations where security is not
an optional feature. Configuration failures are intentional or
non-intentional mistakes made by administrators. Differences
in security cultures [48] may be one exposing factor in this
transition in public safety communication, which involves
cooperation between authorities and civilians. Public safety
actors and solution providers are accustomed to strict secu-
rity policies and practices, while actors coming from the
civilian side may have more relaxed security attitudes and
know-how. These are situations where authorities’ and civil-
ians’ assumptions and capabilities may lead to unanticipated
conflicts and exposures.
C. ATTACK VECTORS AND TYPES
Attacks on public safety communication networks can
emerge from five main directions. Open air interface or local
radio attacks can be made by an adversary within the cov-
erage of a radio access network. Such adversaries may be
visible and, while actively transmitting, their presence can be
sensed. Physical adversaries can intrude on user equipment
or devices in a tactical bubble. The tactical bubble cannot
be guarded in every mission. Remote cyber-adversaries may
advance through different interfaces or with the help of mal-
ware. Insiders are malicious or non-malicious adversary that
have a bridgehead to the operators’ infrastructure. In general,
in the IT world 34% of security incidents involve internal
actors [49]. Non-operational attacks can happen in the dif-
ferent phases of the assets lifecycle. For instance, products
1594 VOLUME 2, 2021
may be planted backdoors or compromised during storage
or maintenance.
The attack type can then be classified according to the
adversarial goal. Our threat classification follows STRIDE
methodology [50], which classifies threats to seven main
categories: spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information dis-
closure, denial-of-service (DoS), and elevation of privileges.
D. RISK LEVELS
Risk is a function of the likelihood of a security incident as
well as the scale and duration of the impact. Risk depends
on the use case and the assets that the use case exposes.
The impact depends on the scale of the affected parties and
assets:
1) Large scale—society’s public safety operations are
prevented. This may lead to life threatening situations.
2) Medium scale—impact against assets or information
belonging to network or network segment operator or
public safety service operator; limited impact does not
prevent society’s operational capabilities completely.
3) Small scale—impact is limited to an individual user
or device, or causes only QoS degradation without
limiting service access completely.
The impact depends on the life-time of the impacted
information or the duration of the asset’s unavailabil-
ity. Long-term threats typically include organizational
information, destructed devices, as well as privacy criti-
cal databases on civilians. Temporary threats include attacks
against operational assets, such as leakage of information
that is valid only during the operation or temporarily failure
within a device.
IV. PUBLIC SAFETY SCENARIO ANALYSIS
This section analyses security in the intersection of public
safety use cases and 5G.. The analysis starts from the public
safety assets that are threatened. The assets include users
(subscribers and operators); devices (hardened, commercial-
of-the-self, and IoT); resources (e.g., spectrum, signaling,
RAN and backhaul capacity, traffic priorization, computing
resources, energy, and infrastructure in general); applica-
tion services (remote control, positioning, and end-to-end
communication); and system services (e.g., security func-
tions); as well as information (e.g., user and organizational
information, identifiers and credentials, and communication
metadata). From the assets, we have defined threat scenarios.
The goal has not been to define every potential scenario but
the most characterizing ones that contain typical or unique
security challenges of public safety communications. The
scenarios are analyzed against the framework proposed in
the previous section and categorized according to their typi-
cal location within the communication architecture domains.
The results are summarized in Table 3.
A. THREAT SCENARIOS IN THE ACCESS NETWORK
DOMAIN
Access networks—both commercial 4G/5G base stations as
well as tactical bubbles—face various threats from local
actors. These threats may occur through the open-air (radio)
or physical interfaces. Adversaries in the radio interface
include nearby UEs and devices that may be outsiders, civil-
ian devices, or misbehaving insiders, certified or uncertified
devices belonging to public safety organizations.
Several weaknesses exists in 4G and 5G proto-
cols [51]–[54]. A central challenge is that part of the control
plane communication is unprotected, which exposes commu-
nication for passive eavesdropping, tracking of user equip-
ment, - or for active tampering (DoS) or man-in-the-middle
attacks. Also, integrity protection for user plane communi-
cation, which was lacking in LTE, is still optional in 5G.
5G provides additional security features and some patches
to LTE vulnerabilities but downgrading attacks are still pos-
sible. 5G is also vulnerable to jamming attacks [55] and
spoofed positioning [56] by malicious nodes; interferences;
and attacks against databases, when positioning is based on
training databases
Operational information of public safety actors’ capabili-
ties can be leaked to eavesdroppers. For instance, adversary
may learn how many operatives or drones are in the field,
what type of devices are used (application, manufacturer
etc.), and where the devices are located. Attacks are possible
since, even though 5G protects user identifiers with asym-
metric cryptography, device capability information [57] and
temporary identifiers are still transmitted in clear text both
in 4G and 5G [58]. Further, traffic analysis based on traffic
timing, amounts, and frequencies or physical layer finger-
prints of the radio transmitter may be utilized to (encrypted)
traffic flows but also on some meta-data to identify UEs.
Device type or in some cases the users’ roles can also be
identified through fingerprinting. In the network layer (see,
e.g., [59], [60]), different applications have different trans-
mission profiles. In the physical layer (e.g., [61]), signals can
be fingerprinted due to different radio transmitters that have
unique properties because of imperfections in manufactur-
ing processes. In loaded prioritized communication situation,
latencies and traffic amounts reveal which UEs have pri-
ority over others and which QoS is provided for which
user. The significance of the threat depends on adversar-
ial capabilities. Detailed physical layer analysis may require
specialized hardware not available to every adversary. The
active transmissions needed to identify the target [58] may
reveal adversary and require that an adversary has gained
privileges to reach users in the public safety network.
The failure of cryptographic protection leaves application
layer communication, containing long-term organizational
secrets, vulnerable to eavesdroppers and man-in-the-middle
attackers. Currently, there are no known cryptographic weak-
nesses in 4G or 5G algorithms that would enable practical
attacks. However, in the future, vulnerabilities may emerge.
Disruptive adversarial capabilities, such as quantum comput-
ing, may enable future attacks on cryptography [62], [63].
Implementation failures such as poor random number gener-
ators, the use of null encryption algorithm EEA-0, accepting
older protocols and thus enabling downgrading attacks, or
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TABLE 3. Threat scenario analysis.
optional end-to-end security [19] may lead to failure of
protection.
Denial-of-service adversaries may exploit the few public
safety specific mechanisms in their attack. Firstly, in pub-
lic safety scenarios where total bandwidth is limited, some
UEs have higher priority. Malicious UEs that have gained
priority have the potential to cause more harm. For instance,
a priority user without bit rate limitations can more easily
deny service from lower-priority users. Secondly, the pub-
lic safety users should have primary access to the licensed
band. Other users, i.e., commercial network operators and
civilian traffic, are secondary users and are given access
only when the public safety user is not using the spectrum.
The spectrum usage is managed through a brokering service
with a centralized database [64] or by sensing the usage
of spectrum locally. Information on the available spectrum
may not be available from the centralized database, e.g., due
to network attack [65]. Consequently, a commercial mobile
network will continue using the same frequencies needed
by the tactical bubble and cause interferences making the
communication less efficient. Thirdly, the distributed hybrid
architecture may make some tactical bubbles ‘orphans’,
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TABLE 4. Assets of tactical bubble in jeopardy.
if an adversary manages to disconnect them from the
mission-critical services. A UE that has connected to an
orphan bubble may not be able to set-up an alternative access
route to the services.
B. THREAT SCENARIOS IN THE NETWORK DOMAIN
Threats in the network domain can be looked at from the
perspective of the 5G core network services (software and
data), infrastructure (hardware), as well as transit (internet-
work) communication. Assets that the hybrid architecture
exposes with geographic distribution are listed in Table 4.
Core Network Services
The 5G core network provides routing and security
services for access networks. Perhaps the most critical ser-
vice is the authentication server function (AUSF), which
manages subscriber information and controls, which users
are allowed to access the network and get the connectivity
service. Authentication server function has access to authen-
tication information and profiles of public safety users and
hence it requires extensive protection. When isolated sce-
narios are supported [5], an authentication database must be
distributed to the tactical bubble and the database must con-
tain information for at least those public safety personnel that
are expected to participate in the mission and hence must be
allowed access to the network. Leakage of this information
may have serious consequences. As 3GPP authentication
relies on symmetric cryptography, leakage in one tactical
bubble could enable an adversary to masquerade as a public
safety user in every bubble.
Availability focused threats are emphasized when the num-
ber of devices used in public safety operations increases.
A high number of simultaneously authenticating IoT devices
may cause a signaling spike that exhausts the resources of
authentication functions in a core or home network [66]. For
instance, civilian devices from a tourist bus going past a mis-
sion site may initiate a large amount of new signaling. The
availability of prioritized applications in high-traffic loaded
situations depends on the configuration of user and appli-
cation priorities and QoS rules. These policies are stored
in core functions and enforced in core and access domain
functions. The potential vulnerabilities lie in the implemen-
tation and operation. Unauthorized parties may be given
access to policy control functions. Also, misconfiguration in
a multi-organization setting may lead to loss of availability.
In dynamic scenarios where priorities are set-up automati-
cally or by application request, false situational information
may lead to misconfiguration. As 5G is increasingly utiliz-
ing machine learning to automate configuration, the threat
of bogus situational data is gaining importance [67].
5G has introduced new opportunities enabling easier cus-
tomization of network to support application or customer
organization services. The opening of the mobile network’s
service API’s [68], [69] to customer organizations enables,
e.g., public safety actors to customize network configura-
tions and QoS. However, opened interfaces, such as policy
control functions (PCF) must be secured and access to them
authorized. The opening of the networks make services more
vulnerable to insider attacks.
Infrastructure
Network slicing and virtualization, which are characteriz-
ing features of 5G, provide flexibility for the resourcing of
public safety applications [70]–[72]. Network function virtu-
alization means that shared hardware can host network and
mission-critical software from different sources. In the hybrid
architecture, core network functions can be located, hosted,
and operated in the tactical bubble, commercial network
providers’ servers or in a public safety dedicated virtual
operator’s cloud. In a typical configuration, access functions
are located in civilian network or in a tactical bubble, which
are connected to the public safety operator’s core services
through the 3GPP S1 interface. Hence, critical functions are
typically not hosted on infrastructure that is shared with civil-
ian users. However, in isolated backhaul-less situations this
is not possible and core services must be brought to tactical
bubbles. If shared hardware hosts critical assets belonging
to different civilian or governmental organizations, there is
a risk that the other misbehaves and gains access to them. The
potential attack may utilize weaknesses in the virtualization
layer enabling misbehaving tenant to circumvent defenses
protecting the other assets [73]. Such an attack can have a big
impact, as the adversary gets access to all information, stored
or flowing through the assets. Furthermore, interferences [74]
and information leaking [75] are possible in SDN based
network slicing. An adversary may gain information from
users in other slices, e.g., by monitoring the response times
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of shared hardware. Misbehaving software that consumes all
the resources may also cause a denial-of-service situation.
Network slicing minimizes these threats by dedicating own
functions and resources for each slice. However, some of the
functions are shared, typically, e.g., part of the control plane,
hardware infrastructure, external services, and authentication
services (user registers). A higher number of shared func-
tions also means a higher number of potential attack vectors
between the slices sharing the functions.
Communication infrastructure may also be vulnerable
through indirect attacks that target systems that the communi-
cation infrastructure is reliant on. For instance, power supply,
heating and cooling, and navigation of cars or aerial vehi-
cles hosting base stations provide alternative attack paths.
Cyber and physical attacks against, e.g., a power grid or
a car supplying power, which are increasing dependent on
ICT, may cause denial-of-service situations. A simple attack
is where the driver, who is driving infrastructure to an oper-
ation site, gets spoofed instructions. More advanced threats
include adversaries that have gained inside access to the
support system.
Transit
Connections between tactical networks and remote
mission-critical services as well as between tactical bubbles
are typically secured with virtual private network (VPN) tun-
nels and application layer security. Further, the perimeters are
secured with firewalls that accept only authorized tunneled
traffic. Due to the complexity of situations an adversary may
find exploitable weaknesses in the backhaul security. A cen-
tral challenge for transit and backhaul networks is how to
assure availability.
C. THREAT SCENARIOS IN THE APPLICATION DOMAIN
Mission-critical application related assets include connec-
tivity services (capability to voice and video based group
communication and information sharing), application servers
in the cloud and tactical bubble, client software in devices,
organizational information (e.g., long-term information on
operatives and their identification data, command hierar-
chies and communication practices), as well as operational
data (e.g., situational information from the mission site).
Further, application specific information may be highly pri-
vacy critical information. For instance, health care records
should be available only for first aid personnel (with the
potential exception of contagious situations that may also
threaten other personnel) and crime registers should be avail-
able only for relevant law enforcement officers. Information
leaking through compromised databases in tactical networks
or by eavesdropped communication as well as external adver-
saries trying to prevent communication are hence the main
security worries.
End-to-end application layer communication is typically
protected but this security may be broken due to practical or
efficiency reasons. Application layer security functions cause
overhead to communication and often prevent performance
optimizations. Applications that require low latency ben-
efit from 5G’s edge computation capabilities to process
information quickly and close users. For instance, it is often
beneficial to do video processing and transcoding at the edge
for performance or interoperability reasons. However, edge
processing means a security breakout. This leads to a more
complicated situation, where an additional middle point (at
the edge) must be verified and trusted. When the threat sur-
face expands, it is more difficult to determine how secure
the application is.
Public safety users communicate within push-to-talk
groups where one user transmits at a time while others
receive. A central issue for security and efficiency of group-
based communication is who has the authority to join a group
and send or receive. Typically, groups are formed using
predefined hierarchies and rules or using ad-hoc mission spe-
cific requirements. Misconfiguration of authorization policies
may lead to:
1) inefficient communication (data is delivered for people
not needing information and thus bandwidth or human
time is wasted),
2) denial-of-service or denial-of-information for some
parties, or
3) leaking of classified information to a device with-
out proper certification or for a user without proper
clearances.
Misconfigurations may be due to human error. The proba-
bility of mistakes increase in isolated or multi-organizational
settings without assigned and educated administrators, or
where responsibilities are unclear and may change during
the mission. In dynamic scenarios where group member-
ships are defined automatically during the operation, false
situational awareness may lead to misconfiguration.
Cooperation between public safety actors and civilian
network operators as well between the public safety core
network and tactical bubbles requires federation in both
the network and application layers. Common practices and
mechanisms for information and policy exchange increase
complexity. Liabilities and responses between cooperating
actors may be unclear [76]. These factors may lead to
information leakage or open up side-channels to systems
of federating party.
D. THREAT SCENARIOS IN THE USER DEVICE DOMAIN
Devices have different security levels depending on the
control features in the hardware and operating system,
enforced policies, as well as maturity and trustworthiness
of software. Security controls include access control, fire-
walls, data encryption, as well as software configuration and
integrity management. In terms of security, the main types of
user devices include a) security hardened cellphones that are
certified for public safety operations, b) unhardened civilian
or bring-your-own (BYOD) phones, and c) other unhardened
systems such as unmanned aerial devices [77] or autonomous
robots [78]. Cellphones can be compromised by different
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cyber-attacks [79], [80]. For hardened devices with stricter
security polices and white listed software, attacks are more
difficult in general but they also remain susceptible to physi-
cal or over-the-air cloning of USIM [81], [82], for leaking of
application layer credentials enabling masquerading attacks,
for physical hacking, as well as for thefts or losses of devices.
Public safety devices may also rely on centralized security
management (for delivery of patches, enforcement of soft-
ware configuration, updating of security policies, as well as
access to revoked certificate information and virus databases)
and thus prolonged isolation may damage devices’ security
levels.
The consequences of compromise include unavailability
or tampered situational awareness, unauthorized access to
critical services, unavailability of networks services (e.g.,
when unhardened devices are attached to a botnet performing
a DoS attack), and a device becoming unusable, which may
lead to safety threats, e.g., crashing towards public or a failed
rescue operation. Uncertified devices should be given fewer
privileges, making the impact of compromise will be lower.
V. SECURITY ENABLERS
This section surveys the security requirements and solutions
proposed and researched for 5G networks and public safety
communications. The solutions for the network, application,
and user equipment realms are identified and then classified
according to the taxonomy proposed in the 5G-ENSURE
security architecture [14]. The results are summarized in
Table 5.
A. ARCHITECTURE AND SOLUTIONS FOR NETWORK
SECURITY
The baseline network security relies on the 3GPP specified
mechanisms for authentication and communication confiden-
tiality and integrity. Additionally, we survey transit network,
network infrastructure, and network management related
domains and their security solutions.
Access and Core Network Domains: 3GPP and indus-
try have specified security architecture — mechanisms and
protocols — for the 5G network [3]. The architecture pro-
vides confidentiality, integrity, and mutual authenticity as
well as some availability protection for wireless connec-
tivity. Access management is based on 3GPP specified
Authentication and Key Management (AKA) protocol varia-
tions (EAP-AKA, EAP-AKA’, or 5G-AKA). User credentials
are stored in a USIM application, which carries symmet-
ric keys that match the user register in home networks.
3GPP has also introduced [3] new authentication approaches
including certificate-based authentication EAP-TLS, and sec-
ondary authentication, where the core network forwards
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the authentication result to the application server, which
provides alternatives for IoT and private types of networks.
Subsequent communication, which follows the authentica-
tion, is protected with 3GPP access stratum confidentiality
and integrity algorithms EEA1-3, EIA1-3, which are based
on: SNOW, AES-CTR, or ZUC.
For tactical bubbles without backhaul, 3GPPP has speci-
fied [4], [5] isolated operation for public safety (IOPS) mode
of operation. Essentially, devices are expected to hold two
USIM applications, one for normal operations and one for
operations within an isolated network. The core network in
an isolated network holds a local user register, the authen-
tication function (AUSF), for authenticating the UEs using
IOPS USIM.
Two specific communication modes are important in
public safety scenarios and have their own security solu-
tions: device-to-device communication and broadcasting.
Proximity communication service (ProSe) enables direct con-
nectivity between nearby mobile devices. Confidentiality
and authenticity of proximity communication as well as
authentic and authorized discovery of proximity services
(and nearby devices) is based on ProSe-specific security
protocols and network-assisted key management mecha-
nisms [83], [84]. There are also research proposals to
enhance the standards, such as cryptographic pairing solu-
tions for disaster scenarios [85]. The multimedia broadcast
and multicast service (eMBMS) security [86] defines func-
tions for authenticating and authorizing the user, for group
and key management, as well as for MIKEY-based key dis-
tribution. The standard uses SRTP and HTTPS to protect
streaming and downloads.
Defenses against the UE tracking threat (and leak-
ing of operational information) include the concealing of
UE identifiers that are transmitted in the open air when
reaching the UE. Firstly, subscription permanent identi-
fiers (SUPI), which are globally unique IDs and are used
when device registers to the network, are protected in 5G
with a mechanisms based on asymmetric cryptography. The
solution is effective as long as older 4G solutions are not
accepted and thus the downgrading attack to previous gen-
erations is mitigated. Secondly, after registration UEs are
identified with temporary pseudonyms (GUTI). These tem-
porary identifiers should be frequently changed to prevent
de-pseudonymization [58].
Transit Domain: Backhaul and inter-bubble security is
required when connecting tactical bubbles to each other or
base stations to distant cores. In mobile networks, back-
haul communication is typically encapsulated using GPRS
Tunneling Protocol (GTP) and secured with Internet Protocol
Security (IPsec). Secured tunneling causes some challenges
as a tunnel hides higher layer headers and thus prevents
application specific optimizations and as IPsec configura-
tion is typically quite heavy process. Transit communication
makes tactical bubbles reachable for remote attacks through
open interfaces and ports and, consequently, firewalls are
mandatory in communication perimeters. The key strategies
to ensure availability include redundancy as well as pro-
tocols and architectures that are designed to be tolerant
against different denial-of-service attacks. For instance, mesh
architectures [87], software defined dynamic routing [88],
dynamic backhaul selection [89], and AI based backhaul
resourcing schemes [90] have been proposed.
Infrastructure Domain: Infrastructure security relates to
the control enablers in the hardware hosting access and
core network functions, including base stations and security
services. Protection is required at different layers: physi-
cal guarding and hardware controls, operating system-level
access controls, as well as controls for the virtualiza-
tion layer. ETSI has specified [91], [92] security solutions
and requirements for network function virtualization. The
approaches include monitoring [93] and trusted comput-
ing [94] to verify and enforce that devices are running
in the expected software configuration and are providing
desired security level. The Cloud Security Alliance has also
proposed guidance for security management approaches [95]
within cloud-edge environments.
Network device vendors utilize their own and third-party
test laboratories, which are accredited by GSMA [96], for
assuring the trustworthiness of products. 3GPP has developed
generic and product specific security assurance specifications
as well as a generic process [97] for creating test specifi-
cations and for evaluating security compliance for product
development and product lifecycle management.
Generic requirements for information security manage-
ment systems, such as ISO 27000 standards [98], provide
guidelines for defining and measuring security of infras-
tructure and systems – both in the network and application
domain – from a holistic perspective. Different nations also
have their own adaptations for such security requirement
and audit criteria, e.g., the American NIST 800-53 [99],
German BSI protection catalogues [100], and the Finnish
KATAKRI [101], which identify and specify technical and
procedural solutions for information security of critical
assets.
Management Domain: For public safety users, a major
requirement is authorization of access priority over avail-
able bandwidth and resources in congested networks. Control
over QoS services as well as access permissions to network
slices, which are dedicated to public safety users, are is
based on the 3GPP’s security architecture and 3GPP’s prior-
itization and QoS management approaches. QoS, priority,
and pre-emption (QPP) policies are either static (stored
in user registers) or dynamically requested. QPP policies
are enforced by the network components (access or core
function). Policies are managed through policy control func-
tion and exposure API [102], which enable third parties,
such as public safety actors, to access and customize 5G
services. The interfaces are HTTP/2-based and secured with
HTTPS, as well as with authorization and identity man-
agement solutions. Tactical bubbles are likely to have some
default policies that are in place when the network is started.
If policies are derived dynamically, security must also cover
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the policy creation processes (e.g., collection of data, which
is used for decision making).
Security information and event management (SIEM) and
secure orchestration automation response (SOAR) solutions
are used to automate security management and to respond
dynamically to detected threats. Security situation aware-
ness is achieved by monitoring infrastructure, network, and
services — to collect statistics and event information — and
is needed when trying to detect on-going threats, includ-
ing attacks and situations where security controls are not
in place or are not working properly. Security monitoring
approaches include both the detection of known attack pat-
terns as well as the detection of anomalies. In typical civilian
mobile networks, the possibilities of monitoring end-users is
limited due to privacy regulation [104], however, in bubbles
or slices dedicated for public safety users’ opportunities to
analyze end-user traffic to detect threats may be greater.
B. SECURITY FOR MISSION-CRITICAL APPLICATIONS
Communication between public safety users should always
be secured end-to-end. Application layer security is needed
for critical applications with highly sensitive information or
valuable assets or for situations where network layer mech-
anisms are not trusted to provide sufficient security level.
End-to-end security services include: identity and access
management as well as confidentiality and integrity – essen-
tially key management and cryptographic protocols – for
unicast and group communication.
3GPP has a specified mission-critical security frame-
work [10] for application layer defenses. The framework
provides
1) authentication and authorization between MC servers
and clients,
2) signaling security, and
3) end-to-end security of media transmission between
clients and between client and server.
The framework is distributed and service-based: an iden-
tity management service enables federated authentication,
a key management server provides cryptographic keys, and
a group management server controls group communica-
tion. These security functions may be implemented within
MCX servers or deployed to separate signaling proxy, which
relays between servers and clients or other services in other
domains. The security framework is built on top of existing
and mature security protocols, which are listed in Table 6.
In addition to the 3GPP framework, non-3GPP mech-
anisms can be used for some applications, e.g., due to
performance, legacy, or interoperability reasons, and con-
nected to 5G via gateways. In particular, different IoT
devices may have their own solutions for securing both
control and data flows. For instance, a common UAV con-
nectivity solution, MAVlink, is secured though proprietary
algorithms [105], [106] and a common sensor and actua-
tor protocol, the constrained application protocol (CoAP),
is secured with Datagram TLS, while LoRaWAN [107]
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provides its own security services and AES based commu-
nication security [108].
Mission-critical group communication applications ensure
that only legitimate users have access to communication
groups. In 3GPP’s MC security framework, the access con-
trol enforcement functions are decoupled from identification
and authentication functions and authorization policies; the
user authenticates to a separate identity management (IdM)
function and MC services only check that the user has been
authenticated properly. Authorization policies are managed
by public safety organizations using MC service vendor
specific solutions, e.g., [109].
Identity and access management services can in princi-
ple be centralized and locate in the cloud or distributed to
the tactical bubble. In distributed scenarios, the authentica-
tion and authorization information is synchronized between
the tactical bubble and remote services. Synchronization
requires federation – common policies and mechanisms. To
enable isolated operations, user information needs to be
copied to distributed locations and is thus more exposed
to data breaches by cyber or local adversaries. Federation
may also be needed between public safety organizations,
as missions often involve users and services from differ-
ent agencies. Policies and practices are needed to agree
on how authorization policies are created, by which orga-
nization and whom, and how changing situations are
handled.
The authorization policies—so-called ‘fleet mapping’
specifying users’ group assignments – are specified to pro-
tect confidentiality and integrity but also for efficiency and
availability of communication. Primarily, users are assigned
to groups to enable efficient cooperation and mission fulfil-
ment. Typically, group communication is hierarchical. For
instance, a group of rescue personnel may communicate
within a group and one person in that group may then
communicate with the field commander, remote mission
center, or other groups of police officers and fire fighters.
Secondarily, other attributes, user and device clearances as
well as context-specific information, may be considered in
authorization. For instance, while the basic security classifi-
cation for mission-critical communication is restricted it is
possible to implement communication groups that authorize
only UEs with proper certification.
The threat of data breach and leaking of authentication
and authorization information can be lowered by minimizing
data that is stored within databases in tactical bubbles. This
may affect the feasibility and usability of applications within
the bubble. Table 7 illustrates potential mitigation alterna-
tives. Nevertheless, bubbles must contain some information.
Authentication information, e.g., private keys, used for
authenticating bubble services for UEs must be present. Such
critical information should be safeguarded adequately, e.g.,
using operating system and device trusted hardware specific
access controls. Another alternative for minimizing the threat
of data breach is to increase the amount of security controls
within the tactical bubble.
C. HARDENED DEVICES
UEs used by authorities are typically cellphones with a con-
temporary operating system, such as Android. Additionally,
more and more IoT devices – sensors, cameras, vehicles–
are utilized in public safety missions. The cellphones are
hardened and certified for the public safety use cases, i.e.,
for handling classified information. Essentially, the goal of
hardening is to minimize the risk of security breaches and
threats towards the network by preventing untrusted features
and configurations. The hardening features include, e.g.,
1) whitelisting of applications, services, and system soft-
ware versions,
2) protecting physical interfaces (e.g., USB) by whitelist-
ing devices and accessories that can be connected,
3) protecting network interfaces, e.g., with firewalls, and
4) securing critical information, software, and credentials
with secure hardware solutions (so-called root-of-
trusts).
Additional means to harden devices include: protection
and verification of software integrity, e.g., assuring particu-
lar software configuration with secure boot during startup.
Trusted platform technologies can be used to protect, detect,
and recover from attacks on integrity of UEs and to provide
security services, such as secure storage or domain isolation.
Hardware root-of-trust provides strong identity to act as
a trust anchor for identification and authentication in the
form of a secret key bound to the hardware. In a secure or
trusted boot, each layer of the system measures and verifies
the integrity of the next layer before execution to detect
tampering of software images, establishing a chain of trust
starting from a small trusted computing base, and reaching
the OS and application software.
Typically, mobile devices protect the most sensitive data
and execution using hardware-backed trusted execution envi-
ronments, TEEs, that isolate execution and data to different
trust domains. TEEs provide code and data integrity and con-
fidentiality for sensitive data, e.g., they can implement secure
storage for credentials. Similar security features are increas-
ingly available in the hardware for constrained IoT devices,
e.g., in the form of ARM TrustZone [110] or RISC-V [111]
security extensions.
Device integrity measurements can function as evidence
of the trustworthiness of a UE, e.g., toward a network or
a public safety service provider. Remote attestation [112]
allows a remote agent, called a verifier, to challenge a device,
called a prover, to report its identity and software configura-
tion over a secure channel to the agent, which then verifies
the integrity state of the device by comparing the measure-
ments against a known good state. In addition to single
prover/single verifier challenge-response protocols, collec-
tive remote attestation protocols have been proposed for the
scalable remote attestation of networks of devices [113].
The detection of integrity violations enables the recovery
of a compromised UE to a known good state, e.g., using
secure software over-the-air update mechanisms. Device
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updates should be protected using encryption and digital
signing of software images.
Security bootstrapping—the delivery of credentials provid-
ing UEs an access to network or application services—can
be based on different alternatives. In a mobile network, the
security is typically based on hardware tokens (USIM). To
support IOPS operations [4], public safety UEs may be pro-
visioned with IOPS USIM applications providing access to
tactical bubbles. A new alternative is the virtualized creden-
tial platform eSIM, which provides more flexibility for public
safety users. Common-off-the-self phones and devices with
eSIM capability can be easily deployed to the public safety
network. Similarly, public safety UEs with eSIM may be pro-
vided with credentials to access civilians’ private networks.
With remote SIM provisioning (RTP) architecture [114] end-
users connect to the network, for instance, by scanning an
operator-generated QR code, by manually entering, or by
using some other out-of-band mechanisms to deliver server
addresses and activation codes. Alternatively, M2M model of
the eSIM architecture enables network to push eSIM profiles
automatically to compatible devices with bootstrap profiles
that are pre-registered to the network. Automated push could
be triggered, e.g., when the devices are moving outside of
the public safety network coverage but are still reachable
from a private network. The subscription manager server
generates subscriber profiles, which are loaded to an embed-
ded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) in the device.
The server must be GSMA certified [115] and authenticated
with TLS. To address the threat of compromised servers
cloning eSIMs, additional mechanism for leaving audit trails
for provisioning actions have been proposed in [116].
Current MC security specifications [10] do not define
how new devices are registered and authorized to network
services. Different out-of-band mechanisms (USB, memory
card etc.) can support credential provisioning. For instance,
certificates for authentication can be delivered to devices
using a USB or memory card and after this the device can
perform mutual TLS authentication [117] with the OAuth2-
based authorization server. Alternatively, OAuth2 supports
the delegation of credentials. For instance, the device autho-
rization grant [118] enables input constrained equipment
to be authorized, e.g., with the help of a cellphone and
QR codes.
VI. SECURITY SOLUTIONS IN PUBLIC SAFETY TRIALS
We have implemented and trialed different public safety
communications related use cases in the PRIORITY
project [119]. In this section, we analyze and describe two
specific security solutions. An overview of the security archi-
tecture is illustrated in Fig. 2. The solutions have been
analyzed against the use cases described in Section II-D,
the threat framework from Section III, and the identified
threat scenarios from Section III. Table 8 highlights the main
findings.
A. REMOTE ATTESTATION ENHANCED ACCESS
MANAGEMENT WITHIN TACTICAL BUBBLES
IoT devices, e.g., surveillance cameras or UAVs are increas-
ingly utilized in public safety missions. These devices are
susceptible to remote cyber-adversaries trying to install mal-
ware and taking control of the device as discussed in
Section III-C. To mitigate this threat, remote attestation [112]
can be used to verify the integrity of the device and to detect
unauthorized changes in the device firmware. Such additional
evidence of device’s trustworthiness could also be used, e.g.,
as one attribute in prioritization of users or the device could
even be required to prove the absence of malware by remote
attestation before it is allowed to join the network.
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FIGURE 2. Security enablers explored in the trials include satellite backhaul securing with IPsec, identity management (IdM) for mission-critical (MC) services in tactical
bubble, and remote attestation of IoT devices.
TABLE 8. Threat mitigations* by trialed solutions.
Approach: In the trial, the devices within a tacti-
cal bubble communicate with backend services that ver-
ify the devices’ identity using the OpenID Connect and
OAuth 2.0-based authentication and authorization frame-
work. Thus, the services act as OAuth 2.0 resource
servers. The authorization server authenticates devices
using OAuth 2.0 mutual-TLS client authentication (RFC-
8705) [117] and X.509 certificates. We extend this frame-
work to perform integrity verification of device firmware
as part of authentication and to convey attestation sta-
tus of the device to resource servers within the OAuth
2.0 access token. Our prototype implementation is based on
IdentityServer4 [120].
In the solution we describe, remote attestation is based on
Trusted Computing Group’s (TCG) implicit identity-based
device attestation specification [121], which uses a device
identifier composition engine (DICE) as the root-of-trust
for the integrity measurement. Following the specification,
device’s secure bootloader generates a device ID key pair that
is used as device’s identity. Furthermore, it derives another
key pair, called alias key pair, and certifies it using the
device ID credentials. The integrity of the device firmware
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is measured before the firmware is executed and the mea-
surements embedded into the alias key certificate to form
a basis for remote attestation.
The IoT device is represented by a NuMicro M2351 [122]
microcontroller. Device boot, key derivation, and integrity
measurements are isolated from the device firmware using
ARM TrustZone for ArmV8-M [110] technology. The device
ID private key never leaves the device’s trusted environment
and cannot be accessed by the device firmware. The alias key
pair’s private key and certificate are exposed to the device
firmware to be used as TLS credentials.
When new devices are introduced into a tactical bubble,
they are not assumed to have pre-established trust relations
or authentication credentials. As the result mutual-TLS based
authentication cannot be used to authenticate the device at
this point. In the trial we implement end-user assisted secu-
rity bootstrapping of devices. This method is based on OAuth
2.0 Device Authorization Grant (RFC-8628) [118]. In this
method, a device requests for end-user authorization to reg-
ister itself with the authorization server. It does so by first
requesting a device authorization code from the authoriza-
tion server, which it then delivers to an end-user, who is
deploying the device, via out-of-band channel, e.g., device’s
display or near field communication with another UE. The
end-user then authenticates herself with the authorization
server, e.g., using a mobile phone, and provides the code to
the authorization server which grants an OAuth 2.0 access
token to the device on behalf of the end-user. The device
uses the access token to register its device ID certificate with
the authorization server.
After registration, the device can authenticate itself
directly with the authorization server and request for OAuth
2.0 access tokens without end-user involvement. We extend
device authentication by remote attestation so that the device
provides evidence of its integrity to the authorization server
as follows:
1) The device requests an access token from the autho-
rization server. It authenticates to the server using
X.509 based mutual-TLS authentication and the alias
key certificate as its TLS client certificate.
2) The authorization server authenticates the device dur-
ing the TLS handshake against a database of registered
device ID certificates. If authentication is successful
and DICE certificate extensions are present, it forwards
the certificate to an attestation service for integrity
verification.
3) The attestation service verifies the integrity of the
device by validating the alias key certificate and
comparing embedded integrity measurements against
a reference integrity metric database. The service
issues an attestation token describing the result of the
integrity verification procedure and returns the token
to the authorization server.
4) The authorization server issues an access token and
embeds the attestation token into the access token as
an additional claim. Following RFC-8705 [117] the
access token is bound to the client’s TLS certificate.
The access token is passed to the device.
5) The device receives the access token and passes it
to the resource server with the request it intends to
perform.
6) The resource server verifies that the client’s TLS-
certificate matches the certificate fingerprint bound
to the access token, establishing proof-of-possession.
Furthermore, it contacts the authorization server to
validate the access token.
7) The resource server extracts the attestation token from
the access token and uses its information to make
decisions about the trustworthiness of the device and
the data it provides.
The device registration phase can be enhanced with remote
attestation in the same way. However, since security boot-
strapping is not yet completed, the trust to the attestation
report must be established by other means.
The authorization policies can be created when new
devices are introduced to network by the users within tac-
tical bubbles or by a remote control service. Default policy
templates for particular device types or user roles can be cre-
ated during non-operational time. Policies should be stored in
a secure database that is attached to the authorization server.
The server and database can be kept either in the tactical
bubble or in the mission-critical cloud. The user experience
of fine-grained authorization can be simplified with the solu-
tion. As the attestation provides verified information on the
type of device, access permissions can be granted implic-
itly. Access control objects and predicates, i.e., services and
actions, that should be available for devices with partic-
ular type or role are typically known in advance. Hence,
the end-user making ad-hoc decisions in the mission-site
is not required to be queried on each authorization sepa-
rately. Similarly, it is possible to make security policies that
limit particular services accessible only for devices that are
attested to be trustworthy.
The reference integrity metric database that the attestation
server needs to verify UEs’ integrity is delivered to tactical
bubble in similar fashion, e.g., from public safety opera-
tor’s centralized service, which collects the information on
acceptable devices from the manufacturers.
Discussion: Remote attestation of constrained IoT devices
is still an emerging topic and far from a standard prac-
tice. However, several initiatives [121], [123], [124] are
enabling gradual shift towards more trustworthy devices. The
approach discussed in this section has various advantages.
The solution delegates the verification of device integrity
to the attestation service and thus provides similar ben-
efits by separation of concerns for remote attestation as
OpenID Connect and OAuth 2.0 frameworks provide for
authentication and authorization: simplicity of implementa-
tion and configuration management, as well as, scalability
VOLUME 2, 2021 1605
SUOMALAINEN et al.: SECURING PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS ON COMMERCIAL AND TACTICAL 5G NETWORKS
as the mechanisms can be distributed. Moreover, the solu-
tion re-uses a mature framework already used in many
cloud environments and supported by 3GPP for identity
management [10].
The solution requires no modifications to the authentica-
tion and authorization flow from the client’s or the resource
server’s perspective. On the contrary, both the integrity mea-
surements and the attestation token are embedded in the
existing protocol messages, allowing the same mechanism
to be used with devices, authorization servers, or resource
servers that do not support our remote attestation solution.
Rather, the solution allows remote attestation capable devices
to provide additional evidence of their trustworthiness. In
fact, due to the heterogeneity of IoT devices and lack of
remote attestation support in the existing products, this kind
of mixed mode operations is likely.
The solution is based on TLS and uses X.509 certificates
and asymmetric key cryptography, which could cause too
much overhead for the most constrained devices. A more
recent TCG DICE specification [125] discusses symmetric
key cryptography for TLS-PSK based authentication and pro-
vides a remote attestation mechanism that could be more
suitable for such devices.
The solution is targeted at constrained devices, where all
the software is typically installed and run as a single applica-
tion firmware image provided by one source, e.g., the device
manufacturer. Richer UEs, e.g., mobile devices, typically
run various applications from many sources, each updated
separately, complicating integrity measurement and refer-
ence integrity metrics management. Hence, these systems
also require more complex integrity verification and remote
attestation solutions. Nevertheless, public safety authorities’
typically have strict security policies in place that limit
the number of acceptable devices, whitelist permitted soft-
ware configurations, and strictly control software installation.
Consequently, due to well-known device configurations com-
pared to, e.g., civilian operators, remote attestation could also
be a viable option for richer UEs in the public safety domain.
B. SECURING SATELLITE BACKHAUL FOR TACTICAL
BUBBLES
Since tactical networks must be rapidly deployable in remote
and rural locations, wireless backhaul is sometimes the
only solution for connecting the tactical bubble to the
core network or application server. Dedicated point-to-point
microwave links (7–40 GHz) are often used in commercial
cellular networks for wireless backhauling, but they have
limited range and require expertise, time, and licenses to
deploy [126]. Commercial satellite services, on the other
hand, provide near ubiquitous connectivity across the globe,
can be at best deployed in a matter of minutes without
expertise and do not require spectrum licensing. Satellite
backhauls are therefore attractive candidates for providing
the required connectivity to the core network and applica-
tion services for access and regular bubbles [127]–[130].
Satellite networks can also be deployed as redundancy to
TABLE 9. GEO satellite network features.
improve availability, for example, in situations where the
terrestrial network or other backhaul options are congested,
unavailable or compromised due to an attack.
In the trial, a geosynchronous equatorial orbit (GEO)
satellite link was selected as a backhaul solution due to
the maturity of the technology, availability of commercial
portable devices, and the capability for sufficient data rates
in the selected use cases. Some of the main threats arising
from the use of GEO satellite link for connections between
the access network and remote core or MCX servers are
listed in Table 8. Many of the threats are due to the unique
features of the GEO satellite networks that are summarized
in Table 9.
1) SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Since the backhaul may contain both the user plane data as
well as the control plane signaling, the confidentiality
and integrity of the satellite link traffic are of paramount
importance. The features listed in Table 8 may, however,
compromise the backhaul security and availability, unless
appropriate measures are taken to protect it, as discussed in
detail below.
The coverage of a high throughput GEO satellites is typi-
cally divided into several spot beams (like cells in terrestrial
networks) that each span a geographic area several hun-
dreds of kilometers across [131]. Due to the high altitude
of the GEO satellites and broadcast nature of the trans-
missions, the downlink (satellite-to-ground) traffic can be
intercepted and signal tampered at any location within the
spot beam with roughly equal signal quality using low-cost
commercial equipment [132], [133]. This is in stark contrast
to microwave links that are extremely directional, require
specialized equipment, and are difficult to intercept without
detection. Furthermore, unlike terrestrial 5G that has confi-
dentiality and integrity protected air interface, many satellite
operators use either simple scrambling or do not protect their
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over-the-air traffic at all [134], [135], exposing the down-
link data to passive eavesdropping within a large geographic
area. Adversaries might, for example, intercept all transmis-
sions towards the tactical bubbles in the capital region from
a fixed location that is hundreds of kilometers away from it.
Intercepting the uplink (ground-to-satellite) transmission, on
the other hand, is more challenging due to the highly direc-
tional antenna of the very-small-aperture terminal (VSAT)
user equipment. In practice, the adversary would need to be
very close to the VSAT on the ground or a UAV or a crane
car would be needed to lift the intercept receiver near the
main lobe of the transmit signal [136]. While this is signifi-
cantly more challenging than eavesdropping of the downlink
transmission, intercepting the uplink signal is still feasible,
at least at higher latitudes, where the elevation angle of the
GEO satellite is low.
To combat the long latency of the GEO satellite link, the
extensive use of edge processing and local storage (caching)
may be needed to guarantee desired QoS for the users
in the tactical bubble [128]–[130]. For the same reason,
commercial satellite networks use performance enhancing
proxies (PEPs) and acceleration techniques, such as TCP
spoofing, to improve the performance of the satellite link.
Some satellite operators also offer proprietary solutions
for GTP-U acceleration of the LTE backhaul traffic [137].
However, the use of edge processing and different accelera-
tion techniques expand the threat surface by creating security
breakouts, as discussed earlier. Typical PEP implementations
also break the end-to-end semantics of IP connections and
prohibit the use of IPsec. But failing to protect the transport
layer data opens up the possibility for TCP session hijacking
due to the long latency of the satellite link [135]. The delay
and jitter of the satellite link also prevent the synchronization
of the access network from the master clock using precision
time protocol (PTP) messages, as specified in the IEEE
1588-2008/2019 standards [138]. The tactical bubble there-
fore needs to use global navigation satellite system (GNSS)
based synchronization, which is prone to jamming and DoS
attacks [133], or to rely on the accuracy of local oscillators.
Both approaches can have an impact on the performance and
security of the system if not properly addressed.
The limited uplink capacity has a direct impact especially
on the operation and security of the access bubbles that
rely on external core network functions. A great number
of simultaneously authenticating devices, whether civilian
devices or critical users, may overload the satellite uplink
and temporarily block the registration of legitimate users
to the bubble. A similar issue may arise unintentionally if,
e.g., many legitimate IoT devices inside the bubble activate
simultaneously, causing a signaling storm between the tacti-
cal bubble and the core network due to the control signaling
overhead arising from the creation of a large number of GTP-
tunnels. Furthermore, the limited capacity of the satellite
connection may lead to an extensive use of edge processing
and acceleration techniques in access and regular bubbles.
Traffic prioritizing and selection for the backhaul may also
be necessary to avoid exhausting the limited resources of
the satellite link. While such techniques improve the user
experience, they also complicate the architecture and expand
the threat surface.
Although standardization activities aiming at harmonizing
the terrestrial and non-terrestrial networks in 5G are pro-
gressing with the initial target for 3GPP Release 17 [139],
[140], current GEO satellite systems are mostly based on
DVB-S2/RCS and/or proprietary solutions. Since many of
the security and control mechanisms listed, e.g., in Table 1
and Table 4 require support from the system, they cannot be
enforced on the satellite link that relies on different standards
and security mechanisms [141] than the 5G based access and
core networks. For example, access control, user prioritiz-
ing, reservation of resources and security measures may not
be in the control of the tactical network operator, implying
that the satellite backhaul of the critical user is treated the
same as any other link in the satellite network. This may
lead, e.g., to insufficient security measures and service dis-
ruption if the spot beam is heavily congested. For the same
reason, priorities of the traffic flows may not be inherited
by the streams in the satellite link, so that traffic prioritizing
and selection needs to be carried out in the tactical bubble
before the backhaul, creating a potential security threat, as
discussed earlier.
The last features of the GEO satellite networks discussed
in this section stem from the architecture and geography of
the system. The simplest GEO satellites operate as radio
frequency (RF) repeaters (so-called bent pipe architecture)
that translate and amplify the RF signal from the uplink
frequency to the downlink frequency, and vice versa. At
worst, all uplink RF signals at correct carrier frequency,
malicious or legitimate, are mixed and re-transmitted in the
downlink. If the malicious signal is strong and of the same
form as the legitimate signal, it may block the transmis-
sions of the legitimate users. Since commercial systems may
not be protected against malicious interference, a denial-
of-service attack via hostile electromagnetic interference is
possible [133], [136], [142]. The downlink signal to the tac-
tical bubble can also be jammed directly, but due to the
highly directional antenna of the user equipment, the mali-
cious transmitter would need to be very close to the VSAT,
or elevated near the main lobe of the receiving antenna, as
in the case of uplink eavesdropping discussed earlier. A geo-
graphic feature that has a direct impact on the security is
that the ground station that connects the GEO satellite to the
operator’s backbone network may reside in a different coun-
try than the tactical bubble, potentially exposing the internal
network traffic to insiders of foreign nations. The connec-
tion between, e.g., the access bubble and the core network
may also cross several borders over a public IP network,
expanding the threat surface significantly.
2) APPROACH
Satellite backhaul has some obvious security implications
on the operation of the tactical network, as can be observed
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from Table 7 and the above discussion. It should be clear
that a commercial GEO satellite link must be treated as
an inherently unsecure transmission medium, requiring at
the very minimum a strong end-to-end security solution to
satisfy the requirements of MC operations.
In the trial, Dawson Ka-Sat SC-Zero 70K nomadic
terminal from Viasat was used as a connectivity option
for a Goodmill multichannel router. In addition to selected
application-layer security features listed in Table 5, IPsec
encapsulating security payload (ESP) tunnels were chosen
to provide confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection for
the satellite backhaul. Security gateways that guarantee hid-
ing of the IP addresses and fully encrypted communication
between the tactical bubble and core network or MCX server
were installed. While the use of IPsec implies overhead and
degraded performance of TCP traffic, the protection of MC
data, servers and operation was deemed to be of higher
priority than the diminished user experience. It should be
noted, however, that IPsec tunneling does not solve all issues
raised in this section. For example, the threats due to jam-
ming, signaling storms, congestion of the satellite network,
or architectural enhancements, like edge processing, traffic
prioritizing and traffic selection, cannot be mitigated simply
by using IPsec tunneling.
Instead of accepting the performance degradation due to
end-to-end IPsec ESP tunnel, the use of trusted PEP in the
satellite operator premises could be considered. Either the
entire stream could be decrypted, or just the headers that
are needed to enable the acceleration [131], [143]–[145].
This creates a security breakout at the operator premises,
potentially located abroad and subject to local rules and
regulation, paving the way for several infrastructure and
transit threats as described in Table 2. For the regular bub-
ble, it would be possible to rely on transport/application
layer security measures listed in Table 5, but this still leaves
open security threats that may be unacceptable to MC users.
An alternative approach based on the QUIC protocol and
specifically designed for the GEO satellite links, QPEP,
has been proposed recently [146]. However, more work is
needed, to verify its compatibility with the MC services and
requirements. It should also be noted that the higher layer
security mechanisms are not an option for the access bub-
ble since the protocol stack for the communication between
the access network and the core network is inherently
unsecure [147].
To avoid blocking due to signaling storms arising from
simultaneous device registrations, the user register and
authentication function could be located inside the access
bubble, but additional security measures are then needed to
protect them from adversaries. The signaling storms due to
GTP-tunnel creation could be mitigated by prioritizing the
devices and allowing only a limited number of data sessions
to be opened within a given period. With extra cost, priority
in the satellite network might also be available from the satel-
lite network operator and, for example, VPN tunnels could
be established between the satellite operator’s backbone and
core network to avoid unsecure delivery over a public IP
network.
VII. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
This section introduces potential paths for future research to
harden public safety communicatons.
A. TACTICAL SECURITY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
AND ORCHESTRATION
The security posture of tactical bubbles depends on envi-
ronmental parameters, which are different and variable in
every mission – different users, different communications,
different adversaries, different threats, and different secu-
rity resources. Security requires configuration, monitoring,
and adaptation to changing situations and security events.
Dynamic configurations can be partly based to remote con-
figurations by centralized security operations centers (SOC).
However, in isolated scenarios, the possibilities of doing
on-site configuration is virtually non-existent due to other
operational hurries. Consequently, there is a need to research
security automation solutions for tactical bubbles, i.e., to
develop tactical SOC capabilities.
Tactical networks must be rapidly deployed to remote
locations and must be operational as soon as they arrive
or within a few minutes. Security configuration tasks of
the deployment time include: setting up security associa-
tions between network components, allocating resources for
security services, launching or deploying (e.g., migrating
virtualized) security functions to support operations and to
monitor and respond to emerging threats, as well as enabling
isolated scenarios by choosing and deploying user and autho-
rization policies (e.g., a complete national database of every
public safety organization or some subset). Risk-driven secu-
rity analysis tools could be beneficial when automating
deployment of security control and assets. For instance, the
risks within tactical bubbles depend on the assets and crit-
icality of information stored in them as well as security
controls that are available. Analysis tools could determine,
e.g., whether a particular bubble is secure and guarded
enough to be deployed with user databases.
Machine learning solutions may be beneficial in facilitat-
ing automation and increasing security situational aware-
ness [148]–[150]. They can support security monitoring,
collecting and analyzing security KPIs, verifying run-time
situation against (complex) security policies, as well as intru-
sion, malware, and anomaly detection. They can also support
security event management and orchestration of security
responses.
Security automation and applications of ML can leverage
the unique characteristics of public safety scenarios. First,
the security awareness and skills of public safety users can
be assumed to be above average when compared to other
users of mobile networks. Consequently, automated security
responses can be more aggressive and rapid. For instance,
a detected anomaly may initiate quicker user notification
and UE quarantine, than would be possible in civilian use
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cases. Second, privacy is not a similar issue, as private appli-
cations and personal communications are typically limited.
Consequently, privacy regulations [104] that may limit mon-
itoring in civilian networks may not be a problem in public
safety communications. Third, the threat detection may in
some cases be more accurate in homogeneous public safety
networks as the used applications and protocols are known in
advance and produce traffic patterns that repeat in every mis-
sion. Hence, there is less unanticipated traffic and noise that
could cause false alarms. The accuracy of these assumptions
and speculations need verification through future research.
However, there are also challenges in automated configu-
ration:
1) The strong requirement for availability in public
safety scenarios may limit some reactions, as service
disruptions are not tolerated.
2) Automation and ML may open up new kinds of
vulnerabilities [67], [151] to the 5G systems.
3) The mission environment is different in almost every
mission, so it is difficult to learn what is normal and
thus detect anomalies. Tactical networks are rapidly
deployed to locations and environments with opera-
tional parameters—channel characteristics, sources of
interference, amount and type of users, number of
groups and their members, used application, number
and type of local and cyber adversaries—that are often
unpredictable and unknown in advance.
4) Data that is available locally in tactical bubbles
is limited. Centralized cloud services have, hence,
superior learning abilities. Solutions are needed to
enable federation between tactical and centralized SOC
functions. Solutions should enable isolated security
operability without compromising sensitive centralized
information.
Further research is needed to understand what operational
parameters remain the same and can be utilized to learn mod-
els, which are describing normal behavior. Research is also
needed to increase trustworthiness and protection of inferred
security awareness and data, which is collected from civilian
devices [152] or a heterogeneous sensor device landscape,
or which shared between different federative actors.
B. CUSTOMIZING COMMERCIAL NETWORK SERVICES
TO ENSURE AVAILABILITY
Commercial operators can customize their networks for par-
ticular users. The policy control function and 5G’s exposure
APIs provide the means to customize allocated resources and
QoS. Network slicing provides more means to allocate virtu-
alized resources for different applications. The customization
could also include different kinds of security services. Future
research is needed to reveal the full potential of security
customizations and to identify security applications that can
provide added-value to customers. Some potential means to
customize network include
1) guaranteed availability via additional capacity, redun-
dancy, and optionally reserving alternative backhauls
such as satellite links [129] for just-in-case situations,
2) assured trustworthiness, e.g., by utilizing only cus-
tomer approved hardware and software components
and attesting the integrity of the network configuration
at run time,
3) new routing architectures, such as Secure Internet
Architecture (SCION) [153], [154] promise addi-
tional availability guarantees and end-to-end security
awareness for 5G backbone networks, as well as
4) extensive security monitoring and customized security
policies and controls.
C. MILITARY-GRADE CUSTOMIZATIONS
While 3GPP technologies have been developed from com-
mercial and cost-effectiveness perspectives, military grade
technology research for secure communications, e.g., [155],
[156], could provide new perspectives to enhance (and
customize) the security of public safety communications.
Military-grade solutions can mitigate risks of growing impor-
tance or which play a more vital role in public safety and
disaster recovery operations.
For instance, physical-layer security solutions [157], [158]
provide one perspective for providing additional defense
against adversaries in the radio channel. Secrecy coding
provides confidentiality against eavesdroppers and has been
simulated [159], e.g., in the LTE context. Physical layer
fingerprints have also been proposed as an identification
approach in 5G [160].
Current 5G security algorithms are not fully resistant
against quantum computer based cryptanalysis. Quantum
resistance is currently being standardized [161] and also
planned for mobile networks [62] Consequently, new devel-
opment, i.e., algorithms and protocols that can support
additional overhead, are needed both in the network layer but
also for application and backhaul communications. However,
many applications of public safety communications are by
nature operational and tactical and there are not many long-
term secrets that the future emergence of quantum computers
would threaten.
Effective cooperation between various parties, such as
allied armies or different public safety organizations, requires
federation and interoperability both in the practices and
technologies. Federated approaches where different but, not
necessarily fully trusting, actors cooperate emphasize, e.g.,
layered cryptographic protection [162]. Such mechanisms
utilized in the military domain may also be utilized in pub-
lic safety communications to support cooperation between
different public safety agencies or between public safety and
civilian organizations.
D. CERTIFICATION OF VARIOUS TYPES OF PUBLIC
SAFETY EQUIPMENT
UEs targeted at public safety missions are typically certi-
fied by nationally accredited laboratories. They are assured
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to provide a security level that enables them to handle
information classified, e.g., as restricted or confidential.
However, existing certification approaches [96], [97] have
been dedicated for cellphones or network equipment. As
the device landscape for public safety operations is rapidly
expanding, new solutions and schemes for testing and cer-
tifying [163] UAVs, sensors, cyber-physical systems, rescue
robots, and other equipment used by authorities are needed.
Similarly, these new devices also require platform security
solution, which increase their robustness against different
attacks but are also usable and easily deployable for public
safety missions.
On the other hand, as unhardened devices will be used
in public safety operations, access control solutions both in
the network and application layer must be made more toler-
ant against threats caused by compromised and misbehaving
devices.
E. INTEGRATED SATELLITE-TERRESTRIAL ACCESS
A promising future solution for mission-critical communi-
cations would be a 5G network with an integrated 3GPP
compliant satellite access based on a LEO megaconstellation.
Many of the protocol and signaling weaknesses of the satel-
lite link would be mitigated by conforming to the terrestrial
3GPP requirements and security mechanisms. Integration
of the networks would also allow, e.g., user and traffic
prioritizing, QoS control, traffic selection, and network man-
agement to be orchestrated jointly, improving the overall
security of the system [164]. In addition, the short delay and
high throughput of a LEO megaconstellation would eradi-
cate many of the threats present in the GEO satellite links
and multiple satellites offer redundancy.
While the impact of LEO satellite links on the 5G air
interface are well studied, research on the security aspects
of direct 5G LEO satellite access for mission-critical users
is lacking. For example, the transmissions from the LEO
satellites are prone to eavesdropping both from the ground
and space, frequent inter-beam and inter-satellite handovers
as well as inter-satellite routing complicate the system archi-
tecture, and requirement for low manufacturing costs open
possibilities for satellite device based threats. Some potential
research topics could include
1) secure and dynamic three-dimensional routing and
handover procedures,
2) confidentiality and integrity protected inter-satellite
communication, including use of free space optical
communications, physical layer security and quantum
communications,
3) use of on-board processing, e.g., to enable novel cross-
layer approaches to detect and reject malicious signals
at the satellite,
4) remote attestation of the satellites and network con-
figuration,
5) securing of core network functions and MEC function-
ality in the non-terrestrial segment.
F. COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMERCIAL AND
TACTICAL CONTROLS
Customized security services in the operator’s network or
physical or cyber controls in tactical bubbles require addi-
tional human resources for management and operations as
well as software and computing investments and main-
tenance. Consequently, they will incur additional costs.
Decisions to invest in new security solutions require bal-
anced security trade-off analysis between quantified risks,
costs of attacks, and costs of defenses. The goal of the
analysis is to minimize the costs of security (additional phys-
ical and cybersecurity controls), to minimize risk (which is
a function dependent on exposed assets, cost of impact, and
probability of impact), as well as to maximize feasibility.
Further research is needed to understand how existing risk-
driven cost-benefit analysis frameworks for cybersecurity,
e.g., [165], [166], can be utilized in a mobile network and
public safety context.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article explored the security characteristics of public
safety communications using 5G technologies. The transi-
tion from dedicated infrastructure to hybrid architecture is
expanding the threat landscape mainly due to:
1) sharing of globally-connected civilian-operated infras-
tructure (that is more open for remote cyber-
adversaries and for attacks from the Internet),
2) vulnerabilities inherited from 5G technologies (which
are complex and inherit many compromises and
vulnerabilities from the previous generations),
3) distributed architecture (increasing physical and geo-
graphical exposure, introducing breakouts to end-to-
end security), as well as
4) heterogeneous devices and applications (bringing
added complexity and vulnerabilities).
The essential challenge of public safety communications
is the need for assured availability, which can be achieved by
a combination of various device, network, and application
layer approaches. Central issues include how to guarantee the
capabilities of the commercial operators’ networks to ensure
quality and to support prioritization mechanisms in dynamic
and complex scenarios. Commercial and virtual public safety
network operators must protect against interferences from
civilians and information leaking towards advanced adver-
saries. The need to support isolated operations also requires
special arrangements and increases the risk of leaking critical
user identification and organizational data.
Different risks can be minimized with additional techni-
cal and physical security controls or by limiting applications,
features, and information that are deployed to tactical bub-
bles. Additional layers of protection can be added on top
or under the standard 5G security: a) the network operator
can customize the security services it provides for public
safety users and b) the public safety users can deploy own
application layer and device-specific security solutions. The
trialed satellite-backhaul was an example of network-layer
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means to assure availability while remote attestation provide
an example of additional means to assure trustworthiness
of the device layer. However, additional layers and controls
come with costs and the cost benefits of using commercial
communications networks are partly lost. Hence, the security
investment decisions should be preceded by thorough risk
and cost-benefit analyses.
Future technological development is needed in the
area of automated security configurations and improved
security reactiveness of networks and tactical bubbles. As
network scenarios are becoming more complex and isolated
operations are performed under an assumption of zero-
configuration, adaptive and learning-based security appli-
cations could help to maximize the security performance
with minimal efforts. The 5G architecture provides many
promises for improved performance and latency but also
new security risks by distributing processing to edges, to
private networks, or to tactical bubbles. More development
and research, e.g., in the area of federation, is needed
before mission-critical applications can fully benefit from
these opportunities. Further, security of new types of public
safety devices from augmented reality and aerial surveil-
lance to rescue robots and autonomous systems require new
methodologies for cost-efficient security hardening, testing,
and certification for public safety missions.
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